

**City of Chicago**  
**COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS**  
740 N. Sedgwick, 3rd Floor, Chicago, IL 60610  
(312) 744-4111 (Voice), (312) 744-1081 (Fax) (312) 744-1088 (TTY/TDD)

**IN THE MATTER OF:**

Levy Johnson	)	
	)	
Complainant,	)	
v.	)	CCHR No.07-E-23
	)	
Fair Muffler Shop a/k/a Fair Undercare Car	)	Date of Ruling: March 19, 2008
a/k/a Fair Muffler & Brake Shops	)	Date Mailed: April 11, 2008
Respondent.	)	

**FINAL ORDER ON LIABILITY AND RELIEF**

TO: Andrew J. Cohen	Fair Muffler Shop
Law Offices of Andrew J. Cohen	Attn: Terrence Michaels
77 W. Washington St., Suite 1900	8259 S. Cicero Ave.
Chicago, IL 60602	Chicago, IL 60652

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that, on March 19, 2008, the Chicago Commission on Human Relations issued a ruling in favor of Complainant Levy Johnson. The Commission orders Respondent Fair Muffler Shop to pay damages to Complainant in the amount of \$78,710 plus interest from October 31, 2006, and to pay to the City of Chicago total fines of \$500.<sup>1</sup> The Commission also awards Complainant attorney fees and associated costs. The findings of fact and specific terms of the ruling are enclosed.

Pursuant to Commission Regulations 100(14) and 250.150, to seek review of this order, parties may file a petition for a common law *writ of certiorari* with the Chancery Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County according to applicable law; however, because attorney fees proceedings are now pending at the Commission, such a petition cannot be filed until after the issuance of the Final Order concerning those fees.

Pursuant to Reg. 240.630, Complainant is ordered to file with the Commission and serve on the other parties and the Hearing Officer a statement of attorney fees and/or costs, supported by argument and affidavits, no later than 24 days after the date of mailing of this Order and Ruling to the parties, that is, on or before **May 5, 2008**. Any response to such statement shall be filed with the Commission and served on the other parties and the Hearing Officer within 14 days of the filing of the statement. Any reply brief by Complainant shall be filed and served no more than 10 days after the filing of any response. A party may request additional time to file and serve any of the above items pursuant to the provisions of Reg. 270.130.

**CHICAGO COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS**  
Dana V. Starks, Chair and Commissioner

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<sup>1</sup>**Compliance Information.** Reg. 250.210 requires parties to comply with a Final Order after Administrative Hearing no later than 31 days after the later of the Board of Commissioners' Final Order on Liability or any Final Order on Attorney Fees and Costs. Payments of fines are to be made by check or money order payable to City of Chicago, delivered to the Commission at the above address, to the attention of the Deputy Commissioner for Adjudication and including a reference to this case name and number. Payments of damages and interest are to be made directly to the Complainant. See Reg. 250.220 for information on seeking enforcement of a relief award.

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Fair Muffler Shop a/k/a Fair Undercare Car	)	Date of Ruling: March 19, 2008
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Respondent.	)	

**FINAL RULING ON LIABILITY AND RELIEF**

**A. INTRODUCTION**

Complainant, Levy Johnson, filed a Complaint alleging that Respondent Fair Muffler Shop a/k/a Fair Undercare Car a/k/a/ Fair Muffler & Brake Shops (Fair Muffler) discriminated against him because of his race.<sup>1</sup>

An Order of Default was entered against Fair Muffler by the Commission on May 17, 2007, in which Fair Muffler was deemed to have admitted the allegations of the Complaint and to have waived its defenses to the Complaint's sufficiency. The Order of Default was entered because Fair Muffler did not file a Verified Response as required by the Commission's Respondent Notification and Commission Regulation 210.220. Fair Muffler ignored a Notice of Potential Default mailed on April 27, 2007 by the Commission by certified mail, which stated that if Fair Muffler did not file its Verified Response on or before May 11, 2007, the Commission would enter an Order of Default. The certified mail receipt shows that the Notice of Potential Default was received on April 30, 2007. Fair Muffler never filed a Verified Response. No representative of Fair Muffler attended the Pre-Hearing Conference or the Hearing in this case.

No objections were filed to the Hearing Officer's First Recommended Decision, which was issued on December 21, 2007. By leave of the Hearing Officer, Complainant filed a Supplemental Post-Hearing Brief in Support of Front Pay Damages setting forth calculations for the discounted present value of the front pay requested.

**B. FINDINGS OF FACT**

1. Levy Johnson, an African-American male, was employed at Fair Muffler at 8259 S. Cicero, Chicago, Illinois. (Tr.8, 34) He worked there from July to December 2006. (Tr.9) He did work on cars, mostly related to mufflers. (Tr.34)

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<sup>1</sup> Johnson also checked the "retaliation" box on the Commission complaint form. However, the Chicago Human Rights Ordinance (CHRO) defines "retaliation" as an action taken "against any individual because that individual in good faith has made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under [the CHRO]." Chic. Muni. Code §2-160-100. Because Johnson did not engage the Commission's process before being discharged, this Complaint is more accurately viewed as alleging harassment and discharge based on race.

2. Brian (last name unknown), the Caucasian manager of Fair Muffler, called Johnson a nigger in October 2006 and said that “all niggers were the same.” Johnson complained to Terry Michaels, owner of Fair Muffler. (Tr.10-11, 35) Michaels told him that Brian did not mean that. (Tr.12)
3. Brian then told Johnson, “Damn nigger, you never know what the fuck you’re doing.” (Tr.13) Johnson complained to Michaels, who said that he would talk to Brian. (Tr.14)
4. Brian called Johnson a nigger again and said there was no room in “this damn shop for niggers.” (Tr.14) Johnson again complained to Michaels. (Tr.14)
5. In December 2006, Brian again told Johnson that “we have no room in this shop for niggers.” Johnson once again complained to Michaels. After he was called a nigger for the third time, Michaels called a meeting and Brian admitted calling Johnson a nigger. Johnson told Michaels that Brian was taking money from the drawer. Nothing was resolved at the meeting. (Tr. 14-17)
6. When Johnson went to work the next day he was told “there was no more room in this company for [him].” Johnson was given no reason for his termination. (Tr.17) When Michaels stated that Johnson had made a mistake or two, Johnson replied that he had never made a mistake on any car. Johnson told Michaels that Brian had made the mistakes. Johnson was never disciplined while working at Fair Muffler, nor had he ever been told that he ever made a mistake prior to his termination. (Tr.18) He was terminated within a day after making his final complaint to Michaels. (Tr.19)
7. Johnson could not locate another job and had to go through anger management therapy at Resurrection Health Center about a month after his termination, because he was taking out his anger on his wife. The Commission adopts the Hearing Officer’s finding that Johnson was required to obtain this therapy as a result of the discrimination and termination from his employment. Johnson attended anger management therapy for two months and went to eight sessions. (Tr.20-21, 31) He stopped his sessions because he left town to seek work when he was not able to find a job in Chicago. He went to Alabama and found a job there approximately ten months after he was terminated by Fair Muffler. (Tr.22)
8. Johnson found the use of derogatory racial names to be offensive and it caused him to be depressed. (Tr.15) Johnson testified that “it made [him] feel less than a human being.” He had problems eating and sleeping, which lasted a month. (Tr. 43-44)
9. Johnson was unable to find another job in the Chicago area and moved to Alabama. (Tr.22) As a result of his moving to Alabama, he and his wife were separated approximately two months. (Tr.32-33)
10. At the time Johnson was terminated from Fair Muffler, he was making \$9.00 per hour. He

had worked approximately fifty hours per week, of which ten hours were overtime at \$13.50 per hour. He was paid the overtime “under the table.” (Tr.23-24) Johnson testified that as a result of his termination his total lost wages, including overtime, were about \$500 a week or \$24,750 per year. (Tr. 25, 41-42)

11. When Johnson began working in Alabama, he was making \$8.00 per hour, or \$1.00 less per hour than when he worked at Fair Muffler. He also earned less per hour for overtime at his new job. When he worked at Fair Muffler, he earned \$13.50 per hour for overtime but earned \$12.00 per hour for overtime in his new job. He had only five hours of overtime per week at his new job, which resulted in diminished overtime pay of about \$67.50 per week, or \$540 for eight weeks. (Tr.27-28, 39-40)

### **C. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

1. Section 2-160-030 of the Chicago Human Rights Ordinance (CHRO) provides as follows:

No person shall directly or indirectly discriminate against any individual in hiring, classification, grading, discharge, discipline, compensation or other term or condition of employment because of the individual’s race, color, sex, gender identity, age, religion, disability, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, marital status, parental status, military discharge status or source of income.

2. Commission Regulation 345.100 further provides:

Harassment on the basis of actual or perceived membership in a Protected Class is a violation of the [CHRO]. An employer has an affirmative duty to maintain a working environment free of harassment on the basis of membership in any class protected under the [CHRO].

3. Commission Regulation 345.110 defines “harassment” as follows:

Slurs and other verbal or physical conduct relating to an individual’s membership in a Protected Class constitutes harassment when this conduct:

- a) has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment;
- b) has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance; or
- c) otherwise adversely affects an individual’s employment opportunities.

4. Commission Regulation 345.120 outlines employer liability for harassment, in part, as follows:

An employer is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to harassment on the basis of membership in a Protected Class regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence.

5. Because the Commission has entered an Order of Default, Fair Muffler is deemed to have admitted the allegations of the Complaint and to have waived any defenses to the allegations including defenses concerning the Complaint's sufficiency. Reg. 215.240; *McCutchen v. Robinson*, CCHR No. 95-H-84 (May 20, 1998). The Administrative Hearing was held only to allow Johnson to establish a *prima facie* case of race discrimination and whether he is entitled to appropriate relief. A complainant may make his *prima facie* case through his complaint alone or may augment the complaint with testimony if needed. See *Moulden v. Frontier Communications et al.*, CCHR No. 97-E-156 (Aug. 19, 1998).
6. The Commission finds that Johnson established a *prima facie* case of intentional race discrimination. Johnson was referred to in racial epithets multiple times by his manager, Brian, and then terminated from his employment for making complaints about Brian's conduct to the owner of Fair Muffler.
7. Because Johnson's testimony established a *prima facie* case of intentional race discrimination, the only issue is whether that direct evidence is credible. See *Robinson v. Crazy Horse Too*, CCHR 97-PA-89 (Oct. 20, 1999); *Perez v. Kmart Auto Serv. et al.*, CCHR 95-PA-19/28 (Nov. 20, 1996); *King v. Houston/Taylor*, CCHR. No. 92-H-62 (Mar. 16, 1994). The Hearing Officer found that Johnson's testimony was credible and the Commission adopts that finding.

## **D. RELIEF**

### **1. Back pay**

Johnson established that he was subjected to racial harassment by his manager and that he was terminated from his employment because he complained about the harassing conduct. Therefore, he is entitled to recover the wages he lost as a result. The law does not require that a party produce written documentation of out-of-pocket losses as long as the party can testify to them with certainty. See *Soria v. Kern*, CCHR No. 95-H-13 (July 17, 1996); *Khoshaba v. Kontalonis*, CCHR No. 92-H-171 (Mar. 16, 1994).

Johnson was out of work after being terminated from Fair Muffler for thirty-five weeks. Based on Johnson's testimony and the Hearing Officer's findings of fact, during the time Johnson was unemployed he lost \$12,600 for thirty-five weeks of regular hourly time and \$4,725 for thirty-five weeks of overtime at ten hours per week, for a total of \$17,325.

Johnson has requested additional back pay through the date of the administrative hearing because he is receiving lower compensation in his new job (\$1.00 per hour less for his regular hourly rate and \$1.50 less for his overtime rate) than the amount he received at Fair Muffler. As a result of his lower wages at his new job, Johnson has lost \$320 in regular hourly wages for a 40-hour week, (\$1.00 x 40 hours x 8 weeks), \$540 for five hours of overtime lost per week (\$13.50 x 5 hours x 8 weeks) and \$60 for five hours of overtime per week paid at the lower rate (\$1.50 x 5 hours x 8 weeks). The total differential as of the date of the hearing because of Johnson's lower compensation is \$920 (\$320+\$540+\$60). This differential added to Johnson's wage loss from time off work amounts to a total back pay loss of \$18,245 (\$17,325 plus \$920), which is awarded to Johnson as back pay.<sup>2</sup>

## 2. Front Pay

The Commission awards front pay under Section 2-120-510(l) of the Commission on Human Relations Enabling Ordinance, which provides that the Commission shall "order such relief as may be appropriate under the circumstances determined in the hearing," which may include reinstating a complainant or "tak[ing] such actions as may be necessary to make the individual complainant whole." The Commission has previously held that the "make whole" relief under Section 2-120-510(l) is similar to Section 108(J) of the Illinois Human Rights Act, which has been interpreted to authorize the award of front pay where reinstatement is not available because of a hostile atmosphere in the subject workplace. See *Steward v. Campbell et al.*, CCHR No. 96-E-170 (June 18, 1997). See also *Green v. Charles A. Stevens & Co.*, 39 Ill HRC Rep. 3, 24-25 (1988), *aff'd*, *Chas. A. Stevens v. Human Rights Comm'n*, 196 Ill. App. 3d 748, 554 N.E.2d 976 (1990).

Johnson has requested front pay for the difference between the earnings he would have received at Fair Muffler and the earnings he could be expected to receive in the future at his new job. Front pay is usually awarded when there is such hostility that it would be infeasible to restore the working relationship between the parties and to have the victim of the discrimination reinstated to the former position at the same salary. Front pay is usually awarded to make the victim of the discrimination whole and provide sufficient restitution. See *Steward, supra*; *Griffiths v. DePaul Univ.*, CCHR No. 95-E-224 (Apr. 19, 2000). See also *McNeil v. Economics Laboratory Inc.*, 800 F.2d 111, 118 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1986).

This is not a case where it would be practicable to reinstate Johnson to his former position at Fair Muffler, because of the continuous racial slurs he encountered when he was employed there. Johnson was unable to find comparable employment and the time period requested for front pay is relatively short. The front pay award in this case will compensate Johnson for the post-judgment effects of past discrimination, even though there has been a back pay award. See *EEOC v. Century Broadcasting Corp.*, 957 F.2d 1446, 1464 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992); *Shore v. Federal Express Corp.*, 777 F.2d 1155, 1158 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985). A two-year period is a reasonable time frame to allow Johnson to find employment comparable to his old position.

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<sup>2</sup> By failing to appear at the hearing, Fair Muffler lost its opportunity to argue as to whether Johnson sufficiently mitigated his damages.

Johnson's former compensation at Fair Muffler was \$9.00 per hour for 40 hours per week, plus overtime for 10 hours per week at \$13.50 per hour, which for fifty weeks per year would equal \$24,750. At his new job, Johnson is earning \$8.00 per hour for a 40-hour week and overtime at \$12.00 per hour for 5 hours per week, which for 50 weeks per year amounts to \$19,000. Johnson alleges that his loss would be \$5,750 per year or \$11,500 for two years.

However, in a case where front pay is granted, the lump sum must be reduced to the discounted present value of the front pay amount. See *Steward, supra*. Although Johnson failed to present evidence at the hearing of the discounted present value of the front pay claimed, he did so in his Supplemental Post-Hearing Brief. Generally, any evidence not raised at the hearing cannot be raised after the hearing is completed. However, because this is a mathematical calculation only, the Commission will not bar Johnson from seeking these damages.

In the *Steward* case, the Hearing Officer did his own calculation by applying a 9% interest rate where discount rate evidence was not presented at the hearing. The Hearing Officer in *Steward* multiplied the annual front pay amount by a 9% interest rate, subtracted that value from the front pay amount, and rounded up to the nearest \$1,000. Johnson suggests that the discounted value calculation should apply the rate of 3.31%, which he alleges is the Treasury Bill rate. Since Johnson does not cite a single case supporting the use of this rate or any federal statutory guideline, the Commission shall use the 9% interest rate applied in the *Steward* case. Under the *Steward* method, the discounted present value of Johnson's front pay is \$10,465 (without rounding up) and that sum is awarded to Johnson as front pay for two years.<sup>3</sup>

### **3. Emotional distress damages**

Johnson has requested \$35,000 in emotional distress damages. The only case Johnson cites in his post-hearing memorandum is *Mullins v. AP Enterprises et al.*, CCHR No. 03-E-164 (Jan. 19, 2005), in which \$20,000 was awarded to the complainant for emotional distress damages.

In *Arellano & Alvarez v. Plastic Recovery Technologies Inc.*, CCHR No. 03-E-37/44 (July 21, 2004), the Commission awarded \$15,000 in emotional distress damages to Alvarez. She broke out in hives and had irregular sleep patterns as a result of sexual orientation discrimination. She was accused of having AIDS when she called in with a minor illness. Eventually, Alvarez felt compelled to resign from her employment. Alvarez did not testify to any evidence of medical treatment or medication as a result of her emotional distress.

In *Manning v. AQ Pizza et al.*, CCHR No. 06-E-17 (Sept. 17, 2007), Manning was sexually harassed almost daily during her month-and-a-half employment at AQ Pizza. She was physically assaulted and battered, and subjected to constant verbal sexual harassment. The harasser masturbated in front of her. He took pictures of his penis and put them on Manning's cell phone camera. Manning stayed

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<sup>3</sup> The Commission reserves the right to use a different method for calculating the discounted present value rate in future cases if the Commission determines that other courts or agencies regularly adopt such a method.

at her employment only because she needed the money to pay her rent. Manning was subjected to physical and emotional abuse throughout the term of her employment. Manning was awarded \$15,000 in emotional distress damages.

In *Mullins, supra*, cited by Johnson in his post-hearing memorandum, Mullins was terminated because of her disability. As with Johnson in this case, she did not find a job for a year. Mullins was hospitalized for depression after her discharge. The Commission determined that Mullins was a particularly vulnerable complainant because she had a pre-existing depression condition before her discharge. The Commission awarded Mullins \$20,000 in emotional distress damages.

The factors, among others, that the Commission considers when it awards substantial emotional distress damages are: whether there was detailed testimony regarding the specifics of the discriminatory conduct; whether the mental distress was accompanied by physical manifestations and/or medical treatment; whether the discriminatory conduct was particularly egregious, such as face-to-face racial slurs; and whether the complainant was particularly vulnerable. See *Figueroa v. Fell*, CCHR No. 97-H-5 (Oct. 21, 1998); *Nash & Demby v. Sallas Realty et al.*, 92-H-128 (May 17, 1995) (as modified on remand April 19, 2000). All of these factors are present in this case.

The uncontradicted evidence establishes that Johnson was called a “nigger” by Brian, manager of Fair Muffler, on at least three separate dates. Each time he was called a “nigger,” Johnson complained to Michaels, owner of Fair Muffler. All of Johnson’s complaints about the overt racial discrimination were ignored. Instead, Respondent chose to terminate Johnson. The discrimination in this case was severe and egregious. Johnson was forced to work under dehumanizing conditions and no action was taken even when Brian admitted calling him a “nigger.” Brian told Johnson there was no room in “this damn shop for niggers.” Johnson was particularly vulnerable because he did not resign, even after the racial slurs continued, and no action was taken by the owner of Fair Muffler to stop them. Johnson was employed at Fair Muffler for approximately six months.

Johnson did not have a psychiatrist or other mental health professional testify on his behalf. However, Johnson testified credibly that Fair Muffler’s racial discrimination caused him to “feel less than a human being.” He had problems eating and sleeping for a month. After taking his anger out on his wife, Johnson underwent anger management therapy for two months, attending eight therapy sessions. When Johnson was unable to find a job in Chicago, he went to Alabama to find a job there and, as a result, was separated from his wife for about two months. Given Johnson’s credible testimony as to his emotional distress, the Commission awards Johnson \$20,000 in emotional distress damages.

#### **4. Punitive damages**

The Commission has awarded punitive damages in cases where the respondent’s actions were wilful and wanton, malicious, and in reckless disregard of the rights of the individual. See *Houck v. Inner City Horticultural Found.*, CCHR No. 97-E-93 (Oct. 21, 1998); *Boyd v. Williams*, CCHR No. 92-H-72 (June 16, 1993); *Collins & Ali v. Magdenovski*, (as modified) CCHR No. 91-H-70 (Sept. 16,



1992); *Akangbe v. 1428 West Fargo Condo. Assn.*, CCHR No. 91-H-7 (Mar. 25, 1992). The Commission also has determined that punitive damages are required both for punishment and deterrence in situations like this.

In this case, the racial discrimination was particularly overt and humiliating. It included the manager of Fair Muffler calling Johnson a “nigger” on three separate dates, the owner of Fair Muffler ignoring three separate requests by Johnson to stop the racial name-calling, and Johnson being fired after requesting that it stop. The Commission may also consider that in this case, Fair Muffler was defaulted for failing to respond to the Complaint, and that Fair Muffler nor any representative appeared at the Pre-Hearing Conference or at the Hearing. *Hanson v. Assn. of Volleyball Professionals*, CCHR No. 97-PA-62 (Oct. 21, 1998).

Ordinarily, the Commission considers the income and assets of respondents in determining the appropriate amount of punitive damages, but when respondents do not appear at the hearing and thus do not provide evidence about their financial circumstances, the Commission may award punitive damages without regard to this criterion. *Miller v. Drain Experts & Derkits*, CCHR No. 97-PA-29 (Apr. 15, 1998).

In the case of *Manning, supra*, the Commission awarded \$30,000 in punitive damages where the sexual harassment was aggravated and involved racially and sexually insulting oral comments on an ongoing basis along with attempted sexual advances, including physical assault and battery.

In *Salwierak v. MRI of Chicago Inc., et al.*, CCHR No. 99-E-107 (July 16, 2003), the complainant was subjected to egregious and continuous sexual harassment during four years of her employment. She suffered from weight loss and insomnia because of the discrimination. The Commission found the complainant to be particularly vulnerable because she was unable to get the discrimination to end despite numerous complaints. The Commission awarded Salwierak \$30,000 in punitive damages.

In a housing discrimination case, *Figueroa v. Fell*, CCHR No. 97-H-5 (Oct. 21, 1998), the Commission awarded \$35,000 in punitive damages to the complainant, who was the victim of overt and blatant racial discrimination and was subjected to numerous racial slurs.

This is not a case of a single, isolated racial slur but of multiple racial slurs by the manager of Fair Muffler. In turn, the owner of Fair Muffler took no action at all when Johnson complained, and then abruptly fired him. If the purpose of punitive damages is to deter future discrimination and to punish wilful and malicious conduct, this case requires the imposition of substantial punitive damages. Therefore, the Commission awards Johnson \$30,000 in punitive damages.

## 5. Fines

Section 2-160-120 of the Commission on Human Relations Enabling Ordinance provides for a maximum fine of \$500 for each offense in violation of the Chicago Human Rights Ordinance. The Commission has found Fair Muffler in violation of the Ordinance for race-based harassment as well

as discharge. Therefore, the Commission imposes a fine against Fair Muffler in the amount of \$250 for the harassment and an additional \$250 for the discharge, for a total of \$500 in fines.

## 6. Interest

Commission Regulation 240.700 provides for pre-and post-judgment interest on all damages awarded. The Commission awards such interest to Johnson at the prime rate, adjusted quarterly and compounded annually from the date of the initial violation, which shall be set at October 31, 2006.<sup>4</sup>

## E. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

Johnson has also requested attorney fees and costs. They are awarded. Pursuant to Reg. 240.630, Johnson shall file with the Commission and serve on the Hearing Officer and all other parties a statement of attorney fees and/or costs, supported by argument and affidavits, no later than 24 days after the mailing of this Board of Commissioners' Ruling. Further requirements for supporting documentation are set forth in Reg. 240.630. If such statement is timely filed and served as provided above, Respondent may file and serve written responses within 14 days of the filing of the statement, and Complainant may file and serve a reply no more than 10 days after the filing of the response.

## F. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Commission finds Fair Muffler liable for race discrimination in violation of the Chicago Human Rights Ordinance. As detailed above, the Commission awards to Johnson and against Fair Muffler the following relief:

1. \$18,245 as back pay damages;
2. \$10,465 as front pay damages;
3. \$20,000 as emotional distress damages;
4. \$30,000 as punitive damages;
5. Pre-and post-judgment interest on the foregoing damages from October 31, 2006;
6. \$500 in fines, at \$250 for each of two offenses;
7. Attorney fees and/or costs subject to an acceptable statement pursuant to Reg. 240.630.

By:

CHICAGO COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS

  
Dana V. Starks, Chair and Commissioner

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<sup>4</sup> The date of the initial violation in October 2006 is not specifically set forth in the transcript of the Hearing. The Complaint indicated that the initial violation was in the middle of October 2006. As no specific date is set forth, the Commission shall use the date of October 31, 2006.